Global ChangeIntersection of Nature and Culture

On the morality of climate remediation

Tuesday, November 10th, 2009

If a technology exists that can remove CO₂ from the atmosphere, does that mean it’s morally acceptable to emit CO₂ from fossil fuels?  That’s the question addressed by Hale and Grundy in the current issue^1,2 of Environmental Values (subscription required).

In what sense are we culpable for our actions when the damage wrought by those actions can be undone through technological correctives? … Put differently, it is this: if we can correct a wrong by flipping a switch, or by introducing a technology, does this then make our original act morally permissible?

At face value, most people would say yes.  After all, that’s the basis for carbon capture and storage.  But Hale and Grundy argue we often relate pollution with harming others.  Take away the pollutant, and we take away the harm.  If, instead, we believe the moral basis for wrongdoing is disrespect, then things get murkier.

In a fun paper, they pose a set of thought questions to suggest why this matters…

It’s important to begin by defining two views of remediation:  (1) remediation optimists and (2) remediation pessimists.  Here’s how Hale and Grundy distinguish them:

[O]ptimists about remediation may believe that remediation technologies exculpate an actor from responsibility, or at least change the nature of the actor’s decision. These remediation optimists may think that actions that are impermissible in the absence of remediation technology can become permissible when such technology is available. By contrast, remediation pessimists may believe that remediation technology should not significantly change the way we assign responsibility. We argue along such pessimistic lines.

Let’s walk through a few of their thought exercises:

Excerpts:

[Case 1] Jones dumps a pollutant into a river.

[Case 2] Smith dumps a pollutant into a river and subsequently introduces a technology to remediate the pollutant such that its effects are undetectable.

How do we feel about the actions of Jones and Smith?  Most of us probably share the sense that Smith did less harm than Jones, although we don’t know why or how without more details.  And we might even feel that what Smith did was wrong, even though the pollution was cleaned up.

Hale and Grundy argue that

[b]y restoring the river through technological means, Smith is absolved
of wrongdoing in a way that Jones is not. The remediation optimist, in other words, holds that the remediation technology not only neutralises the pollutant, but that, in so doing, it neutralises the moral status of the original act of pollution.

Now let’s look at some more challenging situations that help get to the harm vs. disrespect distinction.

Excerpts:

[Case 3] I develop a poison that has the potential to kill you, but for which I have the antidote. Once the antidote is administered, there will be no ill effects. Suppose I put this poison in your tea while we are chatting, fully intending to administer the antidote immediately once you have ingested the tea.

[Case 4] Before putting the poison in your tea, I mix it with the antidote, thus making the poison an inert additive.

Hale and Grundy argue that there is something wrong about this, even though you wouldn’t not be harmed.  One reason is because there’s a lack of respect in messing with someone’s tea!  Another is that we are unsure what the inert additive is, even if it purportedly causes no harm.  Also, there’s no consent given to poison your tea.  We feel like that’s properly owed.

So let’s consider some even more challenging cases where we take issues of knowledge or harm out.

Excerpts:

[Case 5] Instead of introducing an inert additive to your tea, I add an extra teaspoon of water.

[Case 6] While you are not looking, I remove a teaspoon of your tea and replace it with a teaspoon of tea from the pot.

There is still something weird about these cases.  Would you want someone to do this to your tea?  No harm is done AND there’s no longer an issue of being unclear about some chemical additive.  Again, it’s a matter of consent and respect.

And finally, here’s one last example which suggests that it’s not even consent that matters.  In the end, it’s just respect:

Excerpt:

[Case 7] I enter your house without your permission, take your dishes out of your cabinet, use them, and then wash them, replacing them just as they were. I sleep in your bed, use your sheets, and then wash and replace them.

You have no idea this ever happened.  Were you wronged?  Hale and Gundy argue, yes, that you were shown a lack of respect.  This is not how we wish to treat or be treated by others.

Bottom line: If you follow Hale and Gundy’s reasoning to its logical conclusion, they argue that the act of pollution (CO₂ emission in our case) is morally wrong, even if there are technologies available to remove it from the atmosphere.  Why?

The above examples bring out the forms of respect and acknowledgment that underlie assignments of responsibility, and determinations of permissible and impermissible behaviour, in everyday life….In the sense in which we use the term in this discussion, to adopt an attitude of respect is to acknowledge that the other human beings with whom we co-exist have interests in the shared environment.

….In that sense, the technological promise of remediation ought not to be
mistaken as the moral antidote to disrespect.

….If the polluter can act permissibly when there is a technology available to undo his action, but which is neither designed, nor implemented, nor controlled by him, then we lose any clear reason for holding him responsible even in cases where there is no such technology available.

¹Hale, B. and W.P. Gundy (2009) Remediation and respect: Do remediation technologies alter our responsibility? Environmental Values 18:397-415.

²Bowdon people can access the article here.

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